Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s recent one day visit to Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, marks a surprising shift in the two countries strained relations between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. This diplomatic thaw follows a period of heightened hostility when Somalia’s President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, publicly labeled Abiy Ahmed an enemy of Somalia, accusing him of undermining the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. At the time, the Somalia government organized mass protests in Mogadishu to denounce the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the Republic of Somaliland and Ethiopia.

The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU and Somalia’s Reaction

On January 1, 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland signed an MoU expected to yield significant geopolitical advantages in the region. While the full details of the agreement remain undisclosed, reports suggest that Ethiopia agreed to support Somaliland’s bid for international recognition in exchange for a 50-year lease of a small section of Somaliland’s coastline along the Gulf of Aden.

Somalia’s reaction to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU was swift and strongly opposed:

1. Official Rejection: The Somalia government immediately rejected the MoU, recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia, and prioritized efforts to block the agreement.

2. Parliamentary Action: On January 6, 2024, President Mohamud signed a bill in Somalia’s Parliament declaring the MoU “null and void,” though this move was largely symbolic.

3. Public Protests: The Somalia government organized mass protests in Mogadishu, drawing participation from students, civil society groups, and government officials who voiced their opposition to the agreement.

4. Diplomatic Efforts: President Mohamud launched an international campaign, engaging with the UN, African Union, IGAD, and the Arab League, urging them to condemn the MoU and support Somalia’s stance.

5. Proxy War Threats:  Some Somalia officials, including Foreign Minister Ahmed Fiqi, hinted at the possibility of using the Khatumo militia as a proxy force against Somaliland.

6. Security Concerns and Contradictions: Initially, Hassan Sheikh and his supporters argued that Ethiopia’s access to ports in Somaliland would strengthen terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab. However, his recent agreement with Ethiopia, facilitated by Turkey, grants Ethiopia access to Somalia’s Indian Ocean coast, contradicting his earlier stance.

This raises an important question: Does Ethiopia’s access to a Somalia port impact Al-Shabaab differently than access to a Somaliland port? The answer is simple: terrorism was never the real issue. This is about economic interests specifically, who supplies trade to Ethiopia’s landlocked market. Additionally, Somalia is attempting to prevent Somaliland from gaining international recognition and economic growth.

Somaliland’s Stance on Somalia’s Opposition to the MoU

Somaliland’s response to Somalia’s objections was clear. Former Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi stated: “Hassan Sheikh is not opposing Ethiopia; he is opposing Somaliland’s agreements with the world and falsely claiming that our country is illegal. Our purpose in signing the MoU with Ethiopia is clear Somaliland is an independent country.”

Similarly, Somaliland’s former Interior Minister and current opposition leader, Mohamed Kahin, demanded that Somalia apologize for claiming Somaliland as part of its territory (Reuters, 2024).

Furthermore, the newly elected President of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Irro, also expressed support for the MoU, emphasizing that it would be reviewed by legislative bodies. He had previously stated that his administration would implement the MoU if it benefited Somaliland.

The Ankara Declaration: A Turning Point in Ethiopia-Somalia Relations

As tensions escalated, Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration, aimed at de-escalating the conflict between the two countries. This marked a dramatic shift in Somalia’s stance after previously labeling Ethiopia its enemy, Mogadishu warmly welcomed Abiy Ahmed with songs and flowers. Many observers view this shift as a strategic move to undermine Somaliland sovereignty.

Despite the diplomatic thaw between Ethiopia and Somalia, Somaliland remains firmly committed to its partnership with its neighborhood with Ethiopia. At the World Government Summit in the UAE, President Irro reaffirmed that Ethiopia considers Somaliland its “first friend” (President’s Speech at the World Government Summit, 2024).

Somaliland’s Response to the Ankara Declaration

A spokesman for Somaliland’s ruling Wadani Party, Mohamed Farah Abdi, dismissed the Ankara agreement as irrelevant to Somaliland: “The agreement in Ankara does not concern us. It is between two neighbors, and we are Somaliland. It is normal for two brotherly nations to engage, but it is of no relevance to us.” (Horn Review, 2024).

Somaliland Remains Ethiopia’s Stable, Strategic Partner

Somaliland’s stability and security make it an ideal partner for Ethiopia, offering several strategic advantages, including economic benefits, trade route diversification, and a crucial security partnership. The Republic of Somaliland also plays a key role in protecting neighboring countries like Djibouti and Ethiopia from terrorism originating in Somalia.

Will Ethiopia Risk Somaliland’s Partnership?

Given these advantages, will Ethiopia risk losing a long-term, reliable ally in trade, economic cooperation, and security partnership by endorsing the Ankara Declaration? Meanwhile, Somaliland continues to assert its sovereignty on the international stage, maintaining full control over its affairs without any influence from Somalia, allowing it to enter agreements with international partners.

Conclusion

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia is a historic agreement that has drawn global attention and provoked a strong reaction from the Somalia administration, which disputes Somaliland’s sovereignty.  If Ethiopia backtracks, it risks losing a valuable ally. Regardless of Mogadishu’s diplomatic moves, Somaliland continues asserting its sovereignty, making independent agreements on the global stage beyond Somalia’s control.

Author: Mohamed Abdisamad is the president of the Laasgeel Institute for Policy Studies, based in Hargeisa, Somaliland. He is a seasoned political analyst specializing in Horn of Africa affairs, with a particular focus on Somaliland’s international recognition.He is currently pursuing a master’s degree in international relations and diplomacy.

References

1. Reuters. Somalia’s Cabinet Calls Emergency Meeting Over Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal (2024). Available online.

2. Horn Review. Wadani Party Spokesman Dismisses Relevance of Ankara Agreement to Somaliland (2024). Available online.

3. President’s Speech at the World Government Summit (2024).